NORMS, FORMALITIES, AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS:
A COMMENT
ERIC A. POSNERt
INTRODUCTION

Jason Johnston's Article makes three contributions to the
economics and sociology of contract law.' First, it provides a
methodological analysis of the use of case reports to discover
business norms. Second, it makes a positive argument about the
extent to which businesses use writings in contractual relations.
Third, it sets the stage for, and hints at, a normative defense of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) section 2-201. Although the first
contribution is probably the most interesting and useful, I focus on
the second and third, and comment only in passing on the first. I
conclude with some observations about the role of formalities in
contract law.
I. JOHNSTON'S POSITIVE ANALYSIS

A. The Hypothesis
Johnston's hypothesis is that "strangers" use writings for the
purpose of ensuring legal enforcement. "Repeat players" do not use
writings for this purpose because they expect that nonlegal
sanctions will deter breach. Because repeat players do not use
writings, their legal disputes typically involve the issue of whether
their nonwritten contracts satisfy an exception to UCC section
2-201. Because strangers do use writings, their legal disputes
involve the issue of whether the writings they use satisfy the
section 2-201 writing requirement. In addition, because repeat
players use writings to record obligations in complex contracts, the
"exception" issue will arise only for repeat players involved in
simple contracts.
Despite the simplicity of the argument, there are a number of
hidden complexities. In the following paragraphs I identify those
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that present the most serious barriers to confirmation of Johnston's
hypothesis.
n
n
B. "Strangers
" and "RepeatPlayers
"

1. Legal Enforcement of Cooperation
Between Repeat Players
An initial ambiguity arises over the meaning of "stranger" and
"repeat player." According to Johnston, two parties are strangers
if they have not had prior dealings; they are repeat players if they
have.
The question is why parties that have had prior dealings with
each other would necessarily rely on nonlegal sanctions. The gametheoretic analysis indicates that the threat of losing future business
from the promisee deters breach only if the present value of future
business with the promisee exceeds the benefit of breach to the
promisor, and the likelihood that the promisee would, in fact, deny
future business is significant.
But these conditions are not necessarily implied by prior
dealings. For ease of exposition, imagine that the promisor is the
buyer, that the promisee is the seller, that only the buyer has an
opportunity to breach (that is, seller delivers, then buyer pays or
breaches), and that the cost of breach to the buyer is less than the
cost of compliance, excluding the costs imposed by any sanctions.
Under these circumstances, the buyer would breach unless legal or
nonlegal sanctions increase the cost of breach by a sufficient
amount.
Suppose the buyer purchases goods from the seller at time 0.
When the buyer and seller enter a second contract at time 1, they
will be coded as repeat players. Yet the fact that the parties had a
prior dealing does not mean that the threat of losing future business
(at time 2 and beyond) from seller would deter a breach by the
buyer at time 1. The buyer would not be deterred if he could
simply obtain business from another seller. The game-theoretic
analysis assumes that the buyer is locked in with the seller (for
example, because of a relationship-specific investment). If market
conditions do not lock the buyer and the seller into a relationship,
we would expect these "repeat players" to use a writing in order to
gain the protection of legal enforcement. Johnston should code for
these conditions.
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2. Nonlegal Enforcement of Cooperation
Between Strangers
The converse point can also be made. Just as prior dealings
between parties do not guarantee that they will rely on nonlegal
sanctions to deter breach, the fact that parties are strangers does
not preclude them from relying on nonlegal sanctions to deter
breach. When two strangers enter an agreement that they expect
to last for a long period of time-in which there are many opportunities for each player to penalize the other for breaching, and in
which the rules and payoffs are clear-the game-theoretic analysis on
which Johnston relies suggests that cooperation will occur. The
absence of prior dealings is irrelevant, except to the extent that they
would give each party useful information about the other. Therefore, if the agreement is simple enough, the parties, despite being
coded as strangers, would not use a writing for the purpose of legal
enforcement.
3. Groups and Reputation
A further difficulty with Johnston's analysis is that he does not
adequately account for the effect of group membership. Two
parties are coded as "strangers" if they have not had repeat dealings.
Johnston's hypothesis would predict that these parties will rely on
a writing to enforce their agreement. If the parties belong to a
group in which reputation matters, however, then they will not rely
on legal sanctions. As a result, they will not use a writing for simple
contracts.
In response to this argument, Johnston points out that in a
system of group enforcement, third parties must be able to verify
that a breach has occurred. Verification can (or can most easily)
occur only if parties put their contracts in writing. In contrast, in
two-party situations only the injured party needs to observe the
breach. Because the injured party can directly observe the breach,
a writing is not necessary. The conclusion, however, does not follow
from the premises. When information is cheap, both (i) parties to
a contract and (ii) third parties in a group can observe or obtain
information about the contract and the conduct that allegedly
constitutes a breach. It is possible that the parties to a contract are
less likely to need to refer to a writing in case of a dispute than are
third-party members of a group. But Johnston provides no reason
for believing that this possibility necessarily means that group
members would need writings in order to evaluate claims in a

1974 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 144: 1971
dispute. If reputation effects are sufficient and information is
cheap, they would not. Indeed, Johnston's historical evidence
regarding the failure to use contract formalities in general and
writings in particular comes mostly from the practices of groups, not
from the practices of two-person contractual relationships.
C. Why Would Repeat Players Not Use a Writing?
Johnston's assumption that repeat players would not use a
writing is puzzling. He claims that they would not because they
expect to depend on nonlegal sanctions. But surely-if they are
sophisticated-they know that nonlegal sanctions will not deter
breach at an endgame. Why, then, would they not supply a writing
for this purpose?
Johnston's main argument is that the endgame is too remote to
justify the cost of drafting a contract. This is possible. A writing
sufficient to satisfy section 2-201, however, can be extremely brief
and inexpensive. Because the people who act as repeat players in
some contracts are strangers in others, they must-as occasional
strangers-know about section 2-201. How costly could it be for
such people to supply a writing?
Let me suggest two other reasons why repeat players might not
put their contracts into writing. First, the parties might not put the
contract into writing because they do not want judicial enforcement
of the contract even if an endgame occurs. The parties know that
each will have ex post incentives to litigate a dispute at endgame.
They also know that because of information problems a court is
unlikely to resolve the dispute in a way that maximizes the prospective value of the contract. Ex ante, they would prefer the arbitrary
resolution of nonenforcement, if the alternative is an equally
arbitrary resolution following costly litigation and judicial evaluation
2
of the contract.
Second, repeat players might not put their contracts into writing
because of a norm against writings in their business community.
The parties follow the norm blindly, in a way, without regard to
2 Cf Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete
Agreements andJudicialStrategies, 21J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 316-17 (1992) (noting how
parties who contract through writing often leave out key terms). In the face of
judicial arbitrariness, parties will create "structures" or "disagreement points" in their
contracts, for the purpose of facilitating renegotiation when unforeseen contingencies
arise. Such "structures" would be frustrated by attempts by courts to enforce the
underlying agreement. See id.
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whether writings are or are not cost-justified in their particular case.
This possibility assumes plausibly that it is too costly for parties to
evaluate in every case whether it makes sense to put their contract
in writing, so they rationally defer to the norm. The normative
implications of this explanation are quite different from those of the
first explanation, but I defer comment on them to Part II.C.
D. JudicialEnforcement of Section 2-201
Johnston argues that the case reports reveal whether parties use
writings for the purpose of obtaining legal enforcement. Johnston
seems to say that if a case involves a "writing," a simple contract,
and parties who are strangers, then the parties must have used the
writing in order to obtain legal enforcement.' However, what
Johnston means by "writing" is ambiguous. One possibility is that
"writing" means a writing that meets the requirements of section
2-201. But if this is so, then all the cases involving insufficient
writings have no relevance to his hypothesis. The other possibility
is that "writing" means any writing, even unsigned records and other
documents that do not meet the requirements of section 2-201. If
this is so, then the hypothesis does not make any sense. Why would
strangers try to obtain legal enforcement by using writings that do
not meet the requirements of legal enforcement?
Johnston's answer is that if the writing is insufficient, we know
that the strangers never entered a contract. But this explanation is
not satisfactory. Imagine a case that involves strangers, a simple
contract, and no writing. The case invites two interpretations: (1)
the strangers did not enter a contract; or (2) the strangers did enter
a contract but relied on nonlegal sanctions. Johnston assumes that
the first interpretation is proper,4 but he provides no basis for this
assumption other than his readings of the cases.5 Now imagine a
s Sometimes,Johnston uses the issues raised in the cases as proxies for whether
a writing exists. If a "sufficiency" issue arises, a writing exists. If an "exception" issue
arises, no writing exists. It is not clear why he uses these proxies rather than relying
on the facts of the cases. In any event, this methodological choice does not affect the
criticisms that follow.
"SeeJohnston, supra note 1, at 1889-90 (discussingJones v. Wide World of Cars,
Inc., 820 F. Supp. 132, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that a contract did not exist
between strangers where the parties negotiated but failed to produce a written deal)).
s Here, he departs from the methodological rigor that characterizes the rest of the
study. He might be right aboutJones, where it does look as though the buyer never
intended to commit himself; but it is possible that the buyer did intend to commit
himself and intended to be bound by nonlegal sanctions.
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case that involves strangers, a simple contract, and insufficient
writings. Again, both interpretations are possible. Johnston would
argue that the second interpretation is precluded by the existence
of the writing: if the contract is simple, the parties would not
include a writing for purposes of recording. The insufficient
writings must reflect a preliminary effort, never completed, to lay
the basis for legal enforcement. This argument is possible, but it
makes too strong an assumption about the refusal of parties to
simple contracts to use writings.
E. Summary
The importance of these criticisms depends on the robustness
of Johnston's results. I do not take a position on whether the data
confirm the hypothesis. 6 If they do not, the criticisms present
alternative explanations for the results. For example, if strangers do
not use writings as frequently as one would expect, perhaps this is
because people who appear to be strangers often belong to closeknit groups. If the data do confirm the hypothesis, the criticisms
raise collateral questions that may have interesting answers. For
example, if strangers always use writings, does this result mean that
close-knit groups do not have effective nonlegal sanctions, or that
they do but enforcement of these sanctions necessitates the use of
writings, or just that members of close-knit groups have usually had
dealings prior to contracts that resulted in litigated disputes? By
raising these questions, Johnston's results provide a basis for further
research into the connection between contract doctrines and
business norms.
II. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
A. The Standard Defense of Section 2-201
Imagine a world without the Statute of Frauds. A person I have
never met could go to court and claim that last month I promised
to sell him certain goods for $1000 to be delivered on March 30. It
is now March 30, the market value of the goods has risen to $1500,
and I refuse to go through with the alleged sale. He produces
witnesses (in cahoots with him) who swear that I agreed to the deal.
' The reason I take no position is that I do not have the space to address general
questions about the reliability of coding and other aspects ofJohnston's methodology.
Johnston acknowledges these questions and addresses them in his Article.
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In fact, I did not; but I cannot provide any sort of evidence to
convince a jury that I did not enter this agreement and that the
witnesses are lying. I cannot, for example, show that no such
obligations exist in a written contract, because we have not, by
hypothesis, entered a contract. The traditional rationale for the
7
Statute of Frauds is to prevent this kind of dishonest conduct.
The Statute of Frauds does not, to be sure, make such fraud
impossible; it just makes it more difficult. In a world with the
Statute of Frauds, the wrongdoer cannot convince the court through
the testimony of his cronies. He must instead forge a document
with my signature on it. He might be able to do this, but if he
would prefer the oral method, it must be because forgery entails
greater costs and risks. Perhaps it is harder to forge a document
than to perjure oneself.
There are other possible normative justifications for section
2-201, including the justifications on which Johnston relies. I do
not think they are persuasive, however, and defer discussion of
them to Part III.
B. The Critique of Section 2-201

I have mentioned the benefits of UCC section 2-201; the critics
emphasize its costs. Some parties do not know about section 2-201.
Other parties know about section 2-201, but the costs of putting
their contract into writing exceed the benefits from entering the
contract. As a result, some contracts, otherwise valuable, are not
entered. When parties enter a contract not knowing about section
2-201, or knowing about it but unwilling to incur the costs of
supplying a writing, two undesirable results can occur. First, the
courts may enforce section 2-201 and thus allow promisors to
escape their contractual obligations. Second, the courts may strain
to evade section 2-201, thus holding promisors to their bargain, but
in the process creating complexity and uncertainty in the law.
Neither result is desirable; therefore, section 2-201 should be
abolished.
The critique is not decisive because it emphasizes the costs of
section 2-201 without showing that the benefits are small. The
7 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACTs § 6.1, at 391-96 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing
the origin of the Statute of Frauds); E. Rabel, The Statute of Fraudsand Comparative
Legal Histoiy, 63 LAw Q. REV. 174, 175-78 (1947) (providing a comparative historical
analysis of the reasons motivating the adoption of the Statute of Frauds).
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desirability of section 2-201 depends on whether its benefits
(reducing fraud) exceed its costs (interfering with contracts).
This tradeoff is hard to resolve, but it is worth noting that it
appears to be reflected straightforwardly in the language of section
2-201. First, the writing requirement does not apply to low-value
contracts. It is unlikely that a person would risk a perjury conviction to convince a court that another person owes him a contractual
obligation when the value of the asserted obligation is low. Where
the benefits of a writing requirement are low, an exception to the
rule makes sense.
Second, the writing requirement does not apply to customized
goods. It would be difficult for a person claiming to be a buyer to
make the fraudulent claim that a seller produced customized goods
for his benefit when in fact the two parties never had a contract
specifying the customization. If the parties never had an authentic
deal, then the wrongdoer would not be able to point to goods in the
seller's warehouse that are customized to the wrongdoer's tastes. In
addition, enforcement of the writing requirement would put sellers
who fail to obtain writings in a particularly vulnerable position
because it is difficult to sell customized goods to a third party.
Third, the writing requirement does not apply when one party
has partly performed. Part performance is straightforward evidence
that the parties have a contractual relationship; therefore, it would
be unlikely that a buyer's claim that the seller owes him an obligation is invented.
Fourth, the writing requirement does not apply when one party
has admitted the obligation. If a party admits that an obligation
exists, then it is impossible that the other party has invented it.'
Nevertheless, the question remains whether the rule and its
exceptions are justified in light of the critique.
C. DoesJohnston's Study Undermine Any of the Premises
of the Critique?
Within its methodological constraints, Johnston's study weakens
the critique by showing that some parties do, in fact, take account
of UCC section 2-201 when they enter contracts. If strangers use
' These and other exceptions reflect the problem of determining the proper
degree of formality. As the number of exceptions rises, the formality interferes with

fewer desirable contracts, but it also allows more fraud. See Louis Kaplow, Rules
Versus Standards: An EconomicAnalysis, 42 DuKE L.J. 557,618-19 (1992) (analyzing the
benefits of rigid rules as compared to flexible standards to account for formalities).
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writings for the purpose of ensuring legal enforcement, then they
must know about section 2-201's writing requirement. It might be
argued, however, that repeat players must not know about section
2-201 because they do not use writings. This argument is weak for
two reasons. First, repeat players might not use writings just
because they depend on nonlegal sanctions. Second, since the same
actor sometimes plays the role of stranger and sometimes that of
repeat player, the fact that he uses a writing for the purpose of legal
enforcement when acting as a stranger means that he also knows
about the writing requirement when acting as a repeat player.
But one should emphasize what Johnston's Article does not
show. It does not show that courts evaluate the sufficiency issues
and the exception issues in a predictable and correct way. Indeed,
Johnston's study suggests that doctrinal straining does occur.
Section 2-201 does not have an exception for repeat players. If
courts find exceptions for repeat players, then they do so without
statutory or explicit doctrinal authority.
Even if courts do evaluate the exception and sufficiency issues
properly, Johnston's study does not show that the benefits of section
2-201 exceed its costs. We can see this by considering the case of
strangers and the case of repeat players separately. For strangers,
the benefit of section 2-201 is that it hinders fraudulent attempts to
bind a party to an obligation to which he did not consent; the cost
is that parties for whom it is too costly to supply a writing will not
enter desirable contracts. Johnston's analysis does not tell us
whether the benefits exceed the costs.
Now take the case of repeat players. AsJohnston points out, the
costs of section 2-201 are much lower. If courts do not strike down
the unwritten contracts of repeat players on the basis of section
2-201 (instead finding an exception), then section 2-201 does not
raise the cost of contracting and thus prevent repeat players from
entering desirable contracts. ButJohnston neglects to mention that
the benefits of section 2-201 are also much lower. If courts do not
require a writing, section 2-201 does not serve its purpose of
preventing fraudulent attempts to bind a party to an obligation to
which he did not consent. In particular, section 2-201 does not
prevent a repeat player at endgame from fraudulently claiming that
the other party owes him an additional obligation as part of their
relationship. So if the costs of section 2-201 are lower for repeat
players than for strangers, so are the benefits. But Johnston's
analysis provides no reason for believing that the benefits are
systematically higher than the costs or vice versa.
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Nevertheless, Johnston seems to imply that section 2-201 should
be enforced against strangers because in stranger cases the benefits
exceed the costs, but should not be enforced against repeat players

because in repeat player cases the costs exceed the benefits.
Although a full discussion of this claim is beyond the scope of this
Comment, a few remarks are in order.
Johnston's study may show that repeat players do not use
writings; but it does not reveal whether they bypass the writing
requirement in order to conform to norms or customs, or just
because it is rational to do so whether such norms exist or not.
Suppose repeat players fail to use writings because they belong
to communities with a norm against writings. The norm could be
efficient or inefficient. If the norm is inefficient, there is no reason
for courts to uphold it, and instead the courts should enforce
section 2-201. If the norm is efficient, whether courts should find
an exception to section 2-201 depends on whether courts can
9
enforce the norm more effectively than the community can.
Now suppose repeat players do not use writings simply because
writings are not cost justified. Relevant norms are neutral with
respect to the use of writings. If the use of writings is not cost
justified because of the remoteness of an endgame, but the parties
would want courts to enforce the contract at the endgame, then the
courts should find an exception to section 2-201. If the use of
writings is not cost justified simply because the parties do not want
judicial enforcement at endgame, then courts should enforce
section 2-201. In sum, the implications of Johnston's study for
section 2-201 depend on the reasons why repeat players do not use
writings; but his study does not reveal these reasons.
III. CoNTRACT FORMALITIES

Johnston assumes that UCC section 2-201 is valuable to
strangers because it provides them with a means for signaling their
desire for legal enforcement. But Part II argued that the main
purpose of section 2-201 is to prevent people from fraudulently
convincing courts that nonexistent contracts exist.
This Part
explains why Johnston's assumption-which is common in the
literature-is wrong.

' For a discussion of this issue, see Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The
Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHi. L. REv. 133,
156 (1996) (arguing that courts "should defer to other dispute resolution mechanisms
when those mechanisms provide better ex ante incentives to cooperate").
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An interesting aspect of the Statute of Frauds and other contract
formalities is that they do not fit easily into the default-immutable
rule dichotomy frequently used by contract theorists. A default rule
specifies the terms that will govern upon the happening of certain
contingencies when the parties' obligations in the event of those
contingencies are left unspecified by the contract. For example, the
Hadley default rule states that only damages for foreseeable losses
will be awarded in case of breach unless the contract states
otherwise.1" A formality, such as the Statute of Frauds, also gives
the parties the opportunity to avoid the default (here, nonenforcement), but the parties can seize that opportunity only by engaging
in certain formal acts (supplying a writing). Similarly, the consideration doctrine establishes a default (nonenforcement) that can be
overcome only by certain acts (a quid pro quo).
A "penalty default" is a rule that specifies, as the default, terms
that the parties would not have wanted, in order to give them
incentives to reveal information." Although scholars have tended
to treat the formality as a kind of penalty default, 2 the formality
is different from the penalty default in a crucial way. To avoid the
terms set by a penalty default, the parties must state the terms that
they prefer. Thus, they can avoid the damages limitation set by
Hadley by reciting that the promisor will be liable for consequential
damages in case of breach. To avoid the terms set by a formality,
however, the parties cannot simply state the terms that they prefer.
Parties cannot avoid the nonenforcement outcome set by the Statute
of Frauds or by the consideration doctrine just by reciting that they
prefer enforcement. They must do more. To avoid the terms set
10Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 354, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (1854).
U See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An

Economic Theoy of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (defining "penalty
defaults"). The literature on the use of default rules to give parties incentives to
reveal information is vast; some recent contributions include Lucian A. Bebchuk &
Steven Shavell, Information and the Scope of Liabilityfor Breach of Contract: The Rule of
Hadley v. Baxendale, 7J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 284, 287-92 (1991) (discussing
the conditions under which the Hadley rule causes efficient revelation of information);
Jason S.Johnston, StrategicBargainingandthe Economic Theory ofContractDefaultRules,
100 YALE LJ. 615, 626-39 (1990) (arguing that expansive default rules, such as the
limitation on consequential damages to those which are foreseeable, encourage
bargaining around default rules); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theoy of Default Rules
for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597, 599 (1990) (explaining "the law's
preference for generalized or 'off-the-rack' default rules in commercial contracts");
see also Symposium on Default Rules and ContractualConsent, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 1 (1994).
"2See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 11, at 123-25.
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by a formality, the parties must perform certain formal acts-the
drafting of a writing (in the case of the Statute of Frauds) or the
execution of an exchange (in the case of the consideration doctrine).
By restricting freedom of action in this way, contract formalities

are similar to immutable rules. But immutable rules prevent parties
from obtaining outcomes that differ from the terms set by the rules.
For example, no formalized act enables parties to escape the penalty
doctrine's prohibition on unreasonable liquidated damages
provisions. Immutable rules bar certain terms, regardless of the
process through which they emerge; default rules allow people to
choose terms different from the ones the default rules set; formalities allow parties to obtain the terms they desire only if they follow
a specified process of bargaining.
The reason for these differences is that the function of formalities is different from the functions of default and immutable rules.
Default rules either maximize the value of parties' contracts or give
them incentives to disclose information to each other by contracting
around the rules. Immutable rules protect third parties from
externalities resulting from contractual behavior. Parties may not
contract around them because the resulting contracts would
reproduce the undesirable behavior. Contract formalities protect
people (who are not necessarily parties to any contract) from the
fraud of strangers (but not from an externality arising from another
contract). Parties may not contract around them because this
freedom would enable strangers to engage in the perjury the
formalities are supposed to prohibit. The Statute of Frauds would
not hinder fraud on the court if the wrongdoer could testify that
both parties agreed that the Statute would not apply.
Like many legal rules, contract formalities discourage socially
costly behavior at the price of suppressing socially valuable activity.
Sometimes, the suppressed activity is behavior that grows increasingly valuable as economic conditions change. For example, the
consideration doctrine became less attractive as firm offers and
requirements contracts came into existence. This change does not
mean that the consideration doctrine did not make sense earlier on;
nor does it mean that the current version of the consideration
doctrine-which generally bars gift promises only--does not make
sense. It is possible that gift promises are of sufficiently little social
value that they can be sensibly sacrificed to the goal of reducing
fraud, whereas requirements contracts are so valuable that such a
sacrifice is not desirable.
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Because formalities restrict valuable behavior, parties have
strong incentives to manipulate them. Examples have included the
use of nominal consideration and the placement of the letters "L.S."
next to a signature instead of a seal.'
In addition, because
formalities interfere with the enforcement of valuable contracts,
courts seeking to do substantive justice have a strong incentive to
strain to avoid formalities. As a result, formalities may be intrinsically unstable.
In addition, sometimes a formality loses its ability over time to
deter fraudulent behavior. Where, for example, the seal requirement could be satisfied with the "L.S." mark, it clearly could not
deter fraud beyond the level already achieved by the Statute of
Frauds. If the wrongdoer can forge a writing and a signature
effectively, he can certainly add "L.S." to the document.
The optimal formality is a rule that prescribes' an act that is
cheap for a promisor to engage in but costly for a wrongdoer to
mimic. In the past, the act was a seal; currently, perhaps it is the
signed writing; maybe in the future it will be some kind of personal
identification number verifiable through a recording system.
Clearly, the desirability of a particular formal act will change with
economic conditions and technological advances.
I have set out these arguments at some length because it seems
to me that the purposes of contract formalities are often misunderstood. The mischief was done by Lon Fuller's influential article,
Considerationand Form, which set out threejustifications for contract
formalities. 4 I do not think that any of these justifications are
plausible-at least, not as Fuller or anyone else has articulated them.
Although Fuller's justifications may explain why parties would often
want to use a writing or other precautions, they do not explain why
'3 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 2.16, at 87 (discussing the replacement of seals
on documents with the printed letters L.S., meaning "locussigilli" or "the place of the

seal").
t4 See Lon L. Fuller, ConsiderationandForm, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800-03 (1941)
(describing the evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling functions of legal formalities).
The influence of this article can be found in cases, see, e.g., McIntosh v. Murphy, 469
P.2d 177, 179 (Haw. 1970) (listing Fuller's justifications for legal formalities such as
the Statute of Frauds), hornbooks, see, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, §§ 2.5, 6.1, at
50-51, 394 (discussing and applying Fuller's justifications for legal formalities), and
articles, see, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 11, at 123-25 (comparing Fuller's
analysis to a theory of default rules). An exhaustive Fuller-influenced analysis of the
Statute of Frauds can be found in Joseph M. Perillo, The Statute ofFrauds in the Light
of the Functions and Dysfunctions of Form, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 39 (1974).
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the Statute of Frauds and other formalities should have the
immutable aspect mentioned earlier.15
First, according to Fuller, the purpose of contract formalities is
to give the parties a way of signaling to the court their desire for
legal enforcement (the "channeling" function)."6
Under the
Statute of Frauds, a writing signals that the parties desire legal
enforcement; the lack of a writing does the opposite. The problem
with this argument, however, is that the parties could send such a
signal by simply stating orally whether they desire legal enforcement
or not. If they want to increase the likelihood of the result they
desire, they might write it down. But there is no reason that the use
of a writing should necessarily count as a signal, that is, that the
Statute of Frauds should be an immutable rule. 7 Indeed, courts'
disapproval of ritualized avoidances of formalities, such as recitals
or nominal consideration, is evidence against the channeling view,
since these ritualized activities provide clear signals that the parties
desire legal enforcement. The channeling function justifies a
writing requirement at most as a default rule, not as an immutable
formality. Itjustifies a requirement that the parties articulate their
desire for legal enforcement, not that they do so in writing."8
Second, one might argue that the Statute of Frauds serves the
evidentiary purpose of providing a record for judicial evaluation.' 9
'- Rabel argues that some of thesejustifications may have influenced adoption of
the original Statute of Frauds. See Rabel, supra note 7, at 178. However, the Statute
itself mentions only the antiperjury function. See id. at 175.
16 This seems to be whatJohnston means when he says that abolition of § 2-201
would "undermine the use of a detailed writing in relatively simple transactions,
leading to greater cost and uncertainty in the resolution of disputes arising out of
such transactions." Johnston, supra note 1, at 1907; see also id. at 1906.
" Cf Michael Braunstein, Remedy, Reason, and the Statute of Frauds: A Critical
Economic Analysis, 1989 UTAH L. REV. 383, 423-26 (arguing that parties would often
use writings to send signals even in the absence of the Statute of Frauds).
Information-forcing arguments have been made for default rules, but they do not
provide clear support for immutable rules, see Ayres & Gertner, supra note 11, at 12325 (discussing some efficiency benefits of immutable rules), though there are some
preliminary ideas in this area, see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual
Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 743-46 (1992)
(discussing the relative effectiveness of immutable rules at reducing inefficient
contractual behavior when default rules are incapable of doing so).
" The channeling function is also the dominant explanation for the role of
formalities in the law of wills. See e.g., Bruce H. Mann, Formalitiesand Formalism in
the Uniform Probate Code, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1036 (1994). It would be worth
investigating whether this emphasis on channeling in the law of wills is improper, as
I have argued that it is in the law of contracts, or whether it reflects some crucial
distinction between the law of wills and the law of contract.
" Fuller apparently absorbs the fraud-preventing purpose of the Statute of Frauds
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The parties, however, bear almost all the costs of judicial error if
the record is poor, so they have strong incentives to incur costs ex
ante to create a record, and will produce one if it is cost justified.
It might be argued that because thejudicial system is subsidized, the
parties have an incentive to impose the cost of evaluating the
contract on the court system.2 1 But there is little reason to believe
that a poor record imposes significantly more costs on the courts
than does a good record, and that the value of the subsidy is likely
to be high enough to cause the parties to fail to use a writing when
the parties otherwise care about the accuracy of judicial enforcement.
Relatedly, one might argue that the Statute of Frauds hinders a
promisor from escaping a valid contract by claiming that he never
agreed to it. The writing requirement makes it difficult for him to
do this by providing a record of the promise. The problem with the
argument, however, is that it does not explain why the law should
require promisees to protect themselves in this way. If the promisee
wants the additional protection of a writing, he can insist on it. But
if drafting costs exceed the value of additional protection, he should
not be required by an immutable rule to agree to a writing. Again,
circumvention of the formality should provide evidence sufficient
to satisfy the evidentiary function, but courts refuse to treat the
Statute of Frauds and similar formalities as default rules.
Third, Fuller argued that formalities serve a "cautionary" purpose. 21 This function has been interpreted: as a means for inducing
deliberation; as a means for inducing parties to reveal information
to each other; and as a means for preventing mistakes arising from
the careless use of promissory language. In each case, formalities
have no advantage over a penalty default. When parties go to the
trouble of contracting around the rule (for example, transferring a
dollar bill to satisfy the consideration doctrine or reciting that the
Statute of Frauds does not apply), this behavior forces cautious
deliberation, exposes information, and manifests linguistic care. Yet
into this evidentiary function. See Fuller, supra note 14, at 800 ("The most obvious
function of a legal formality is... that of providing 'evidence of the existence and
purport of the contract, in case of controversy.'"). It is more helpful, however, to
keep these functions distinct.
I See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 11, at 99 (noting that, since most contracts are
unavoidably "obligationally incomplete," the cost of filling obligational gaps is most
efficiently placed on the courts).
2 See Fuller, supra note 14, at 800.
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formalities, unlike penalty defaults, restrict such attempts at

circumvention.
In sum, Fuller-influenced explanations of formalities fail because
they do not explain why parties are forbidden to bargain around
formalities. The purpose of contract formalities such as the Statute
of Frauds is to prevent people from defrauding victims with whom
they do not necessarily have a contractual relationship. It is against
this standard that section 2-201 must be judged.
CONCLUSION
Within its methodological limitations, Johnston's study provides
support for the intuition that strangers care more about legal rules
than do repeat players. In particular, it suggests that strangers
know about and try to conform their contracts to the writing
requirements of UCC section 2-201. As Johnston acknowledges,
however, the normative implications of the study are unclear. The
study does not show that the writing requirement of section 2-201
is necessary or valuable for enabling parties to signal that they
desire legal enforcement. Even if it did, the study does not show
why a writing requirement should be a formality rather than a
default rule. As Part III argued, section 2-201's value as a formality
depends on whether its prevention of fraud justifies its costs in
foregone contracting. But a study that shows behavior that does not
occur as the result of a legal rule could not rely on surveys of
practices or of cases. The necessary study would require a comparison of the amount of fraud that exists in jurisdictions with and
without Statutes of Frauds. Designing such a study would be quite
a challenge, but, if successful, it would finally resolve the centuriesold doubts about the social value of the Statute of Frauds.

